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A Khaldunian Perspective
on the Dynamics of Asiatic
Societies
Syed Farid Alatas

INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty years or so, scholars in the Third World began to
become critical of what came to be known as the captive mind. The captive mind
is uncritical and imitative in its approach to ideas and concepts from the West.
Discussions on the problem of mental captivity coincided with efforts to indigenise
the social sciences in the post-war period when most of the Third World gained
formal independence.
At the theoretical level, indigenization refers to the generation and use of
concepts and theories from indigenous intellectual traditions, historical experiences,
and cultural practices. This essay represents such an activity and indicates an avenue
for the application of the theory of state formation developed by the Arab historical
sociologist, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldun to the case of the Safavi Iranian polity
(907/1501-1134/1722).3 In doing so, a number of theoretical problems in the study
of Safavi state formation that arise from the application of Marxism and worlksystem theory are touched upon. Accordingly, the safavi political economy can be
characterised in terms of a tributary mode of production as the dominant mode in
a secondary state-based world-system. Ibn Khaldun's work provides a theoretical
framework with which to understand the rise of the Safavi world empire.
In what follows a brief outline of ibn Khaldun's theory is sketched. In the
following two sections, I then provide an overview of Safavi economy and society.
In the fourth and fifth sections, ibn Khaldun's theory is used to explain the rise and
nature of the Safavi 'Asiatic' state. This is followed by some concluding remarks
on ibn Khaldun and the indigenization of the social sciences.
1

2

IBN KHALDUN ON THE RISE OF THE STATE

Before we proceed let us turn to a brief excursus on ibn Khaldun's theory.
Abu Zaid 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun Wali alDin al-Tunisi
al-Hadhrami al-Ishbili al-Maliki was born on 1 Ramadan/5 May 732 AH/1332 AD.
After receiving a customary education in the traditional sciences ibn Khaldun held
posts in various courts in North Africa and Spain. After a number of unsuccessful
stints in office he withdrew into seclusion to write his Muqaddimah, a prolegomena
to the study of history which was completed in 1378.
4
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Ibn Khaldun's central concern was with the study of the rise and fall of the
various Maghribi states for which he developed an original method. This begins
with theorizing the differences in social organization between nomadic ('umran
badawi) and sedentary ('umran hadhari) societies. He elaborated on the concept of
authority and the nature of power that it entailed. He saw nomadic civilization as
naturally evolving toward sedentary civilization not in the sense that the one gives
way to the other but rather in the sense that "sedentary culture is the goal of bedouin
life" and that "the goal ofcivilization is sedentary culture and luxury." Fundamental
to his theory is the concept of 'asabiyya or group feeling. Only a society with a
strong 'asabiyya could establish domination over one with a weak 'asabiyyaJ In
this context, 'asabiyya refers to the feeling of solidarity among the members of a
group that is derived from the knowledge that they share a common descent. As we
shall see later, however, descent is not the only consideration. Because of superior
'asabiyya among the bedouin they could defeat sedentary people in urban areas and
establish their own dynasties. Having done so, they became set in the urban ways
of life and experienced great diminution in their 'asabiyya. With this went their
military strength and their ability to rule. This left them vulnerable to attack by fresh
supplies of pre-urban bedouins with stronger 'asabiyya who replaced the weaker
urbanized ones. But the relationship is not one of the domination of the city by the
tribes. Rather it is a relationship of dominance in the other direction of which there
are two important aspects. First of all, the nature of the existence of the tribesmen
makes them dependent on the cities for the basic necessities of life. Secondly, the
tribes are dependent on a prophet or saint (wali) ulama who interpret religion for
them.
When there is a prophet or saint among them, who calls upon them to
fulfill the commands of God and rids them of blameworthy qualities and
causes them to adopt praiseworthy ones, and who has them concentrate all
their strength in order to make the truth prevail, they become fully united (as
a social organization) and obtain superiority and royal authority.
The social cohesion expressed by the concept of 'asabiyya is only partly
derived from agnatic ties in tribal social organizations. While all tribal groups have
stronger or weaker 'asabiyyas based on kinship, religion can also bring about such
social cohesion as was the case with the Arabs who needed Islam in order to
subordinate themselves and unite as a social organization. But beyond this social
psychological aspect of 'asabiyya, there are its material manifestations. In order to
proceed it will be necessary to refer to the concept of mulk (royal authority) in ibn
Khaldun. This is not merely leadership.
Leadership means being a chieftain [sahib], and the leader is obeyed,
but he has no power to force others to accept his rulings. Royal authority
means superiority and the power to rule by force."
Because of'asabiyya a tribal chieftain will be obeyed by his followers, a2 prehttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol29/iss29/4
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condition for achieving royal authority. But it is not merely the psychological
feeling of cohesion that achieves this. 'Asabiyya refers to the authority that is
wielded by the chieftain that derives, in addition, from his material standing as a
result of profits from trade and appropriation from plunder and pillage. For ibn
Khaldun, then,'asabiyya referred to 1) kinship ties, 2) a sociallycohesive religion
such as Islam that provided a shared idiom legitimizing the chieftain's aspirations
for mulk, and 3) the strength of the chieftain through trade, booty, pillage and
conquest.
Once a tribe founds a dynasty and its members assume the various positions
of the ruling class the conditions for the decline in 'asabiyya are established. There
are at least two general ways in which this takes place. One is where the second
generation of tribesmen who founded the dynasty experience a change "from the
desert attitude to sedentary culture, from privation to luxury, from a state in which
everybody shared in the glory to one in which one man claims all the glory for
himself while the others are too lazy to strive for (glory), and from proud superiority
to humble subservience. Thus, the vigour of group feeling is broken to some extent."
By the third generation 'asabiyya disappears completely.
Another distinct way in which 'asabiyya declines is when the "ruler gains
complete control over his people, claims royal authority all for himself, excluding
them, and prevents them from trying to have a share in it." In other words, when
a tribal group establishes a dynasty and its authority becomes legitimate the ruler can
dispense with'asabiyya. The ascendant ruler then rules with the help of, not his own
people, but rather those of other tribal groups who have become his clients. The rule
attempts to exclude the supporting tribe from power. The ability of a tribal chieftain
to maintain 'asabiyya under these circumstances is diminished.
When we speak of diminishing 'asabiyya, then, we refer to the circumstances
under which a chieftain is no longer able to command tribal support 1) by appealing
to kinship and/or other ties, 2) due to the corrosion in social cohesion that results
from either luxurious urban life or from attempts by the ruler to dispense with
'asabiyya. As 'asabiyya decreases, the power of the ruling dynasty diminishes until
it is finally conquered by another tribal group with superior 'asabiyya. And so the
cycle repeats itself. In what follows, I will present a brief overview of Safavi
economy and society, and the Safavi mode of production, after which an explanation
of Safavi history in terms of ibn Khaldun's theory is presented.
12
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SAFAVI ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

The question of the emergence of the Safavi state will be dealt with in a later
section. In this and the next section, a description and conceptualization of the
Safavi political economy is provided.
The three areas of surplus appropriation were agriculture, industry, and trade.
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The ruling class consisted of the state and military bureaucracy, and the religious
institution. The following account on the sources and recipients of surplus is largely
based on the situation in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
In the area of agriculture, land was generally owned by the state. Land tenure
was based on the contract of muzara'a, a share of the crop being the rent. All
categories of land, state, mulk, tuyuUsuyurghal (benefice) and vaqf (religious
endowment) lands were worked by peasants. Tribal khans who were granted tuyul/
suyurqhal land in return for their military services to the Safavi state" had the right
to collect tax revenue from these lands.
The next source of revenue was the urban surplus obtained by means of taxes
and duties imposed on craft industry and trade. In Safavi Iran craft guilds (asnaf,
sing, sinf) were subject to various taxes, as well as to corvees, but the rations, pay
and fringe benefits they received were substantial. As far as trade was concerned,
in Safavi Iran merchants were relatively free from state control.
Apart from the shah and the sultan and their bureaucracies which collected the
surplus, there was also the ulama (religious clerics) who formed part of the ruling
class. The ulama had sources of wealth and economic power such as vaqfVmd. The
sadr administered the arbab-i 'ama 'im (religious institution) and va^/property. In
addition to this, the Iranian Shi'i ulama derived economic power by virtue of being
the direct recipients of a tax called the khums unlike their Sunni counterparts in the
rest of the Muslim world. In addition to this, a poor tax, the zakat was also paid
directly to the Safavi Shi'i ulama.
The ulama were critical of and antagonistic towards the state, this antagonism
increasing as financial problems of the state emerged. The ulama were not unified
into a religious institution and were able to avoid being totally incorporated into the
Safavi state. That is, a distinction can be made between the local Persian ulama and
the imported Arab ulama who were patronized by the Safavi shahs.
Thus, the picture that we have of the Safavi state in the sixteenth century is
one of a strong ruling elite consisting of the civil, military, and religious fractions
extracting surplus from the peasantry, craftsmen and merchants.
There is one more element of the class structure of this society that we need
to mention before we proceed. This is the tribal population. For our purposes, two
important aspects of the tribal population must be understood. One is that they had
played key roles in the establishment of the Safavi dynasty. Beyond this, various
tribes continued to exert an influence on the state and constituted a threat to the
central authority of the state. Together with the ulama they constituted the main
opposition to the state.
Between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries the various tribes constituted
approximately one-fourth of the population of Iran. These tribes were divided into
five major ethnic groups, Turkoman, Iranian, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch. Of
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particular importance, as far as the rise of the Safavi state is concerned, were the
Turkoman tribes. As early as the eleventh century the administrative, economic, and
social systems of Iran came under the influence of the Turkoman tribal institution.
After the Safavi state was established with the aid of tribal military support, vast
territories of Iran came under the administration of uymaqs. The uymaq was a Safavi
concept of tribe that was constituted by economic, administrative, and military ties
between groups that were not necessarily related by ties of kinship, although
succession to the rule of the uymaq was based on kinship. Tribal chieftains or khans
controlled the various uymaqs in Iran to which oversaw both rural and urban
production. The uymaq was the means by which the tribal population became
integrated with sedentary society and participated in the administration of the state.
27

THE SAFAVI MODE OF PRODUCTION
Hitherto works on Safavi society have tended to describe its economic system
in terms of unitary modes of production.
Attempts have been made to characterise the economic system in terms of the
feudal mode of production. Others have characterised the system in terms of the
Asiatic mode of production. The various characterizations of Safavi Iran as feudal
or Asiatic tend to stretch the meaning of the terms Asiatic and feudal too far and also
amount to obscuring the nature of the relations and forces of production that
operated there. Foran's recent article on the modes of production in seventeenth
century Iran is a significant improvement on previous works in that he views Safavi
society as having been made up of three distinct modes of production.
Following Amin and Wolf, my approach will be to view various precapitalist
systems that are based on political coercion in the relations of production as tributary
modes of production. Thus, the feudal and Asiatic systems would be examples of
tributary modes of production, the former being less centralized than the latter. The
intention here is not to engage in an elaborate discussion on the various modes of
production that co-existed in Safavi Iran. The Safavi mode of production was a
tributary one of the 'Asiatic' variety, although this must be understood in terms of
a number of qualifications.
Marx made brief excursions into the history of India and other "oriental"
societies in order to discover what he regarded as the barriers to capitalist development
in these societies. Marx conceptualised the economic systems of these societies in
terms of the Asiatic mode of production.
In the Asiatic mode of production, power is centralised in the state. The entire
economic surplus is appropriated by the state and the state is the legal owner of
landed and manufacturing property. Such a state is extremely strong when it
controls a strategic element in the production process such as irrigation works or an
army of superior military ability. In addition to the centralization of power in the
28
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state, the Asiatic mode of production is defined in terms of the absence of private
property in land, and the combination of agriculture and manufacturing within the
self-sustaining small community. The basic ingredient of historical progression,
class struggle, was missing and Asiatic societies were, as a result, stagnant.
Abrahamian, in his discussion on the Asiatic mode of production in Qajar Iran, finds
two separate explanations for the power of the Asiatic state in Marx and Engels: "1)
the public works were the business of the central government; 2)the whole empire,
not counting the few larger towns, was divided into villages, which possessed a
completely separate organization and formed a little world in themselves." In the
first explanation, the state is strong by virtue of its having a large bureaucracy to
administer public works. In the second explanation, the state is strong by virtue of
the existence of a weak and fragmented society. This is the distinction between what
Abrahamian calls the theory of bureaucratic despotism and the theory of fragmented
society.
Clearly, two traits stand out as not being relevant to the case of Safavi Iran.
These are the prominence of large scale public works and the absence of classes and
class struggle. The centralised despotic state of Safavi Iran derived its power from
neither the administration of largescale public works (theory of bureaucratic
despotism) nor from the existence of a fragmented, classeless society (theory of
fragmented society). There were no large-scale public works for the state to administer
and Safavi society was not classless.
What then was the basis of the power of this state? It was derived from the
control by the state of the superior military capability provided by pastoral nomads.
Invading nomads aided in the establishment of a centralised state. The tribute paid
by tribal members to the tribal chieftain was the forerunner of the Asiatic tax/rent.
The Safavi state was established as a result of the migrations of nomadic peoples.
This then is one trait of the political system that existed in Safavi Iran.
Another trait of the Asiatic mode of production concerns the extraction of
surplus directly from the dominated classes. In the Asiatic mode of production the
state is both landlord and sovereign. Taxes and rent coincide in the sense that there
was no tax that differed from ground-rent. The tax/rent couple is a result of the
"coupling of political sovereignity and landownership in the state which appropriates
the economic surplus directly from the populace then it will be clear that the Safavi
economic system cannot be characterised by 'Asiatic' forms of surplus appropriation
alone. A distinction was made between divani (state) and khassa (imperial estate)
land. It was revenue from the latter which accrued directly to the ruler and his
household. However, not all revenues went directly to the ruler or the state. There
were other forms of surplus appropriation that are to be found in the tributary mode
of production in Safavi Iran. Benefices (tuyul and suyurghal) were also granted in
which cases revenues accrued to the holders of such benefices.
35
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Iqta' is a term for a form of an administrative or military grant. It is an
institution which became regularised during period of the Seljuk Empire (A. D.
10871157). During Safavi times the term was replaced by tuyul and suyurghal.
Tuyul referred to grants of land that were not hereditary and were made mostly in
outlying areas, resembling provincial governments. In return, the tuyuldar (tuyul
holder) provided a military contingent for the shah in times of need. He was also
entrusted with the administration of the land. The term tuyul was also used to
designate land assigned in lieu of salary. Other uses of the term referred to grants
of immunity of property and grants of khassa (imperial estate) land to the army. 49
The term suyurghal was used mainly to denote hereditary or life grants of khassa
and vaqf land, and usufructary property, and often included a grant of immunity.
There are superficial similarities between the institutions of the tuyul/suyurghal
and the fief. These include the grant of land in return for military service, the grant
of land in lieu of salary, the grant of immunities, the high status of the military, and
the existence of an exploited peasantry. However, there is a fundamental difference
between the fief on the one hand and the Safavi institutions on the other. The
granting of a fief was based on a contract of fealty that established a solidary,
fraternal relationship between lord and vassal involving reciprocal obligations of
loyalty. This is in contrast to the granting of tuyul/suyurghal which generally did not
involve a contract of personal fealty carrying reciprocal obligations of loyalty.
Rather they were granted mainly out of fiscal considerations and existed in the
general context of a despotic state. In the feudal mode of production as it existed in
Europe rule at the apex of the system was relatively fragile and weak. Power was
held mainly by local lords. In Safavi Iran, however, rule at the apex of the system
was strong. Land was owned by local lords in the case of European feudalism but
was the property of the state in the case of Safavi Iran. It would, therefore, not be
accurate to characterise the Safavi system in terms of the feudal mode of production.
Any discussion on the Safavi mode of production cannot ignore the presence
of nomadic tribes. The term nomadic pertains to the absence of permanent habitat;
pastoral refers to subsistence by the products of domesticated animals. These
animals provide nomadic society with its basic needs in food (butter, cheese, meat,
yoghurt), drink (milk), clothing (hides, wool), fuel (dung), and means of transportation
(camel, donkey, horses, oxen). Animals, tools, and dwelling items were owned on
an individual basis while grazing land was the collective property of the tribe. The
system of property relations can be understood in terms of the kinship system.
Property is transferred from one individual to another through such mechanisms as
inheritance by sons, marriage agreements, and redistribution through the agency of
tribal chiefs.
The Turkoman tribes of Anatolia are a pastoral nomadic people that are of
direct concern to us because it was the various Turkoman tribes that played significant
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roles in the founding of the Safavi empire. There are various types of pastoral
nomadism but only one is found among the Turkoman tribes. These are multianimal pastoralists who breed sheep, goats, cattle, and camel. But the most important
animal among the Turkomans is the horse. This is due to the fact that very often
the means of subsistence were procured through conquest or raids for which horses
were indispensable.
55

IBN KHALDUN, MARX, AND THE RISE OF THE SAFAVI ASIATIC STATE
Ibn Khaldun's theory has been used to both reject and support the theory of
the Asiatic mode of production. In describing the Asiatic mode of production, Marx
spoke of the stagnation of Asiatic societies such as India, which has "no history at
all, at least no known history. What we call its history is but the history of successive
intruders who founded the passive basin of that unresisting and unchanging society."
Andreski says that the theory of the Asiatic mode of production (or Oriental
Despotism) is contradicted by the fact that "oriental" societies were characterised
by change on a by no means small scale, as indicated by ibn Khaldun's theory of
dynastic succession.
However, reference to this dynamism in itself does not constitute a critique
of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production. It is important to make the
distinction between stagnation on the one hand and the absence of or barriers to
capitalist development on the other. Marx's point was to reveal the absence of
certain pre-requisites to capitalism in "oriental" societies. He did not assert that
"oriental" society was literally stagnant but just that it lacked the dynamism in the
direction of capitalist development of the European sort.
On the other hand, ibn Khaldun has also been used in support of the theory of
the Asiatic mode of production. The latter claims that the "oriental" despot derives
his power from the fragmented nature of his society. The stratification of Asiatic
society into clans, tribes and ethnic groups and the consequent lack of unity among
them along class lines, enables the ruler to keep a firm hand over his subjects. Ibn
Khaldun's theory of dynastic succession, it is said, provides one component of the
orientalist view of despotism in that it stresses the lack of urban and social integration
and thereby supports the view of the insignificance of class as a prime mover of
history. Although Turner is critical of this version of the theory of the Asiatic mode
of production, he has not addressed the issue of ibn Khaldun being used to support
this theory.
Ibn Khaldun's theory can be used in support of Marx's theory of the Asiatic
mode of production, but not in the sense referred to above.
How does ibn Khaldun's theory support the theory of the Asiatic mode of
production? It provides a basis for the despotic nature of the state, that is, for the
56
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theory of bureaucratic despotism (one variant of the theory of the Asiatic mode of
production). While Marx attributed the power of the state to the control of public
works, ibn Khaldun referred to tribal military power as a source of state power. This
situation particularly fits the case of Safavi Iran which did not have large-scale
centralized irrigation works, but which did derive their power from the tribes. The
periodic conquest of dynasties by tribes does not violate the Asiatic mode of
production model for the basic structure of society remains unchanged and the state
remains despotic, merely going through periods of conquest, rise and decline.
Engels himself recognised this Khaldunian cycle in a note worth quoting in full.
Islam is a religion adapted to Orientals, especially Arabs, i.e., on one
hand to townsmen engaged in trade and industry, on the other to nomadic
Bedouins. Therein lies, however, the embryo of a periodically recurring
collision. The townspeople grow rich, luxurious and lax in the observation
of the "law". The Bedouins, poor and hence of strict morals, contemplate
with envy and covetousness these riches and pleasures. Then they unite
under a prophet, a Mahdi, to chastise the apostates and restore the observation
of theritualand the true faith and to appropriate in recompense the treasures
of the renegades. In a hundred years they are naturally in the same position
as the renegades were: a new purge of the faith is required, a new Mahdi arises
and the game starts again from the beginning. That is what happened from
the conquest campaigns of the African Almoravids and the Almohads in
Spain to the last Mahdi of Khartoum who so successfully thwarted the
English. It happened in the same way or similarly with the risings in Persia
and other Mohammedan countries. All these movements are clothed in
religion but they have their source in economic causes; and yet, even when
they are victorious, they allow the old economic conditions to persist
untouched. So the old situation remains unchanged and the collision recurs
periodically.
While Engels makes no reference to ibn Khaldun it is quite likely that both he
and Marx were aware of ibn Khaldun's works. What Engels described above is
very similar to what ibn Khaldun discusses in his theory. However, Marx and Engels
failed to relate this to the Asiatic mode of production. All they could see was that the
tribes were "successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basin
of that unresisting and unchanging society." The periodic rise and fall of dynasties
through successive tribal conquests left the basic structure of the Asiatic mode of
production unchanged.
Ibn Khaldun's theory provides the basis for the despotic nature of the Safavi
'Asiatic' state. This was a tributary mode of production in which state power derived
not from the control of large-scale irrigation works but rather from tribal support.
The Safavi empire was founded with the aid of tribal groups.
Iran was ruled by the Safavi dynasty from 907/1501 to 1134/1722. The Safavi
sufi order upon which the dynasty was founded was established some two hundred
59
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years before the state itself emerged.
The migration of Turkoman nomads from what is today called Outer Mongolia
to the Middle East was represented in part by the Oguz, a nomadic band of warriors
also known as the Seljuks, during the tenth century. By the eleventh century when
the Seljuk Empire was centred at Isfahan, various Turkoman tribes, which were
autonomous from the Seljuks, were trying to establish themselves in Anatolia. The
Seljuk Empire disintegrated in the midst of Turkoman nomadic opposition, giving
way to the establishment of the Great Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century. The
Mongol Empire itself broke up into several parts, divided among the relatives of the
Great Khan. One of these parts constituting Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia became the
Ilkhan Empire founded by Hulagu. Several Turkoman tribes were able to establish
independent principalities as the Seljuks and the Mongols weakened, however.
One of these was the Ottoman (Osmanli) principality established by Osman
of the Kayi tribe which was to subordinate other Turkoman principalities and
establish the Ottoman Empire.
Contemporaneous with theemergence of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth
century was the founding of the Safavi Sufi movement by Sheikh Safi al-Din. His
descendant, Ismail (905/1499-930/1524), a Turkoman from Azarbaijan, was the
founder of the Safavi dynasty. In the mid-tenth century, during Ottoman attempts
to centralize their control in Eastern Anatolia, Ismail took advantage of the turmoil
and attempted to make inroads there. His tribal support came from a number of
Turkoman tribes, the Ustajlu, Shamlu, Taqalu, Baharlu, Zulqadar, Oajar and
Afshar, collectively known as the qizilbash. What held these tribes together was
an 'asabiyya based on the Safavi mystical order to which the qizilbash owed
allegiance. Unsuccessful in Anatoliaandon the defensive, Ismail and his followers
retreated to Iran and established the Safavi state in 907/1501. By 909/1503 he had
control over Azerbaijan, western Iran, and the Tigris-Euphrates basin.
The point of this brief reference to the tribal origins of the Safavi empire is to
emphasize the tribal bases of power in this state. Two types of tributary or 'Asiatic'
states have been recognized, one based on large-scale public works and the other on
pastoral nomadism. Safavi Iran is an example of the latter in which there was a
"non-hydraulic" genesis of the 'Asiatic' mode of production, which can be explained
by ibn Khaldun's theory concerning tribal'asabiyya, religious fervour, and military
superiority.
The Safavi case can be a vivid illustration of the use of both world-system and
Khaldunian theory. The key here would be to view the historical development of the
Safavi political economy in terms of the evolution of a core-periphery hierarchy.
The attractiveness of this approach is that the unit of analysis encompasses the set
of social relations that are held to be central to the rise of the Safavi polity, that is,
the relationship between nomadic and sedentary society. This goes beyond the
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conventional association of civilizations with settled peoples organized around
states. This approach is also compatible with the Khaldunian definition of civilization.
For ibn Khaldun, 'umran refers to the totality of life encompassing cultural, social
and political aspects. Within this totality, there is nomadic and sedentary civilizations.
The core of ibn Khaldun's theory is the role of nomadic-sedentary interaction in the
cyclical rise and decline of civilizations.
There is another variant of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production that
should be considered here. This is the theory of fragmented society, which stresses
the fragmented nature of "oriental" societies into clans, tribes, ethnic groups, and
villages as a source of state power. When it is said that ibn Khaldun's theory of elite
circulation is in harmony with the theory of fragmented society, this is to say that
the tribes, by their very presence as tribes, are an element in a fragmented society
which precludes unity along class lines, thereby bestowing power to the state. The
main objection to this is that ibn Khaldun's theory is not a theory of fragmented
society. In the theory of fragmented society, the tribes play a different role than they
do in ibn Khaldun's theory.
Ibn Khaldun's theory does not provide support for the theory of the Asiatic
mode of production in the sense of the theory of fragmented society. In his theory
the tribe does not play the role, side by side with the village and ethnicity, of
fragmenting society. That is to say, his is not a theory of fragmented society. The
circulation of tribal elites neither radically alters nor reinforces the fragmentation
of society. All it does is to cause the state to swing back and forth between periods
of centralization and decentralization.
Why has ibn Khaldun's theory of elite circulation been seen as support for the
theory of fragmented society, when it seems clear that the role of tribes in the two
theories seem to be vastly different? To my mind, this question can be answered by
recourse to Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity. Some have referred to the
similarity between ibn Khaldun's tribal 'asabiyya and Durkheim's mechanical
solidarity. It is true that tribal 'asabiyya and mechanical solidarity both refer to
solidarity that arises out of similar states of conscience, duties and responsibilities,
that is, a low level in the division of labour. In this sense, both ibn Khaldun and
Durkheim referred to mechanical solidarity. If we stay at this level of comparison,
then it is easy to proceed to the next step, to say that mechanical solidarity/tribal
'asabiyya is exemplified by the fragmentary/segmentary nature of society in which
there is a very low level in the division of labour and, therefore, no social classes.
Ibn Khaldun's theory, therefore, supposedly supports the theory of fragmented
society because it is a theory of fragmented society based on tribal 'asabiyya or
mechanical solidarity. This is opposed to more complex societies of organic solidarity,
based on a complex division of labour and, therefore, social classes. While all this
may be a somewhat accurate portrayal of the similarity between tribal 'asabiyya and
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mechanical solidarity when both are considered in the abstract, when considered in
their proper historical contexts, the comparison is unfounded. Ibn Khaldun, unlike
Durkheim, was looking at the conflict between tribal and urban societies. Ibn
Khaldun described the role of tribal 'asabiyya as not fragmenting society but as
weakening the state.
There is also the issue of whether or not Safavi society was a class society.
While ibn Khaldun's description of the role of'asabiyya did not seek to explain its
fragmenting nature can we, nevertheless, see this aspect of tribal'asabiyya as well?
That is, can the existence of tribes, alongside ethnic groups and villages be taken to
mean that Safavi society was classless? This has been the claim of the theory of
mosaic society. According to this view Middle Eastern societies of the past are seen
as mosaics or patchworks of tribes, minorities, social groups, and associations rather
than an integrated social wholes with a class structure. However, ibn Khaldun,
apart from the fact that his theory was not one of fragmented society, was perfectly
aware of the existence of social classes (tabaqa) in the Middle East. Thus, ibn
Khaldun's theory of elite circulaiion does not provide support for the theory of
fragmented society as a version of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production.
77
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THE DIFFUSION OF 'ASABIYYA IN THE TRIBUTARY STATE

In the foregoing section I discussed ibn Khaldun in connection with the
support of the tributary state by tribal military power. Once these empires were
established, however, there were attempts to absorb the supporting tribes into the
sedentary life of the empire, or in Khaldunian terms, to dispense with'asabiyya. The
very forces behind state formation eventually become a source of instability for the
new state. The stability of the new state rested on its ability to destroy its own
nomadic foundations.
In the event of the establishment of a dynasty through tribal support there
arose the problem of providing adequate remuneration to tribal elites and their
armies who by now aspired towards an urban, luxurious life. The granting of
benefices to tribal chieftains achieved the aim of such remuneration. But, as we shall
see, the absorption of tribal society into the state also had the effect of diminishing
the 'asabiyya of the dominant tribes upon whose power the dynasties rode.
When the Safavi Empire was established, benefices were granted to tribal
chieftains. In Iran benefices known as tuyul were granted to qizilbash tribal chieftains.
These were non-hereditary benefices and differed from suyurghals which were
granted on a hereditary basis. Indeed, it is clear that the "reason for avoiding
suyurghal grants in such cases was the intention to restrict, at least formally, the
autonomy of the high amirs in the provinces." The absorption of tribal society into
the state by way of assigning benefices tribal chieftains and other tribal members
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achieved the dual goal of paying them and reducing their ability to maintain superior
'asabiyya, indicated by their lack of ability to maintain superior military strength
and vie for state power. This decline in 'asabiyya took place in Safavi Iran.
Although, in Iran, the tribal factor remained central to Iranian politics, nevertheless,
there were signs of a decline in 'asabiyya among the qizilbash as indicated by the
difficulty in obtaining sufficient troops encountered by their chieftains as well as
their decline in wealth, territory, and military power.
The effect of incorporation into the state on 'asabiyya was exacerbated by
another tactic described by ibn Khaldun and resorted to by the Safavi rulers. As
mentioned above, according to ibn Khaldun, once a dynasty is established with the
aid of tribal military power, the ruler attempts to dispense with 'asabiyya. The form
that this took in Safavi Iran differs from that described by ibn Khaldun. In the latter
case, the ruler attempts to blunt the aspirations of the people who shared in his
'asabiyya by relying on clients and followers who were nurtured in the shadow of
'asabiyya, or on tribal groups of a different descent who have become his clients.
In Safavi Iran, however, the rulers attempted to dispense with tribal military support
altogether. Shah 'Abbas attempted to reduce the power of the qizilbash elite by
creating a ghulam (slave) regiment through the recruitment of Georgian slaves.
The Safavi Empire was established as a result of the migration of nomadic
peoples. The rulers attempted to diffuse the power of tribal groups once they (the
rulers) were firmly established in power. Nevertheless, for centuries up until the
twentieth, tribal military power was essential in bringing dynasties to power. What
accounts for the prevalence of tribal power in Iran?
One reason has got to do with geography. In the case of Iran, her topography
is such that centralization was more difficult than in other regions such as the
Ottoman Empire. The mountainous terrain made it much more difficult to control
the tribes.
Another reason is the location of the various tribal groups. In Iran the
population of the tribes (estimated at half of the total Iranian population at the
beginning of the nineteenth century) occupied large geographical areas of the
empire.
Thirdly, in Iran, the tuyuldar, consisted of a great number of tribal khans
(chiefs), that is, they were drawn by and large from the tribal population.
Another reason is that, apart from the fact that there were a larger number of
independent and armed nomadic tribes in Iran, the Iranian state was very dependent
on the tribes for its military force. The proximity of tribal groups to the central state
in Iran coupled with the fact that they were superior warriors made them a constant
threat to the state. As ibn Khaldun says of the bedouins: they
are alone in the country and remote from militias. They have no walls
or gates... they provide their own defence and do not entrust it to ... others...
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They always carry weapons... Fortitude has become a character of theirs, and
courage is their nature.
The reason why the bedouin are superior fighters is their life-style. They must
have the ability to pick up and run and start over at another locality. This they can
do much more efficiently than sedentary people as they only have to move people
and flock. And for this reason they are much more difficult to control. They become
a weakening element in the state. Iranian history is testimony to this, the state having
been subject to long periods of breakdown during which time various tribal forces
came to power. For example, in the eighteenth century tribal dynasties such as the
Afshars, Zands and Qalars competed for power, and military power was dominated
by the tribes.
88
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CONCLUSION
An immediate concern of this paper has been to make an argument for the
cogency of the Khaldunian theory of state formation for debates surrounding the
'Asiatic' mode of production and its applicability to Safavi political economy. This
effort is to be seen within the context of the call to the indigenization of the social
sciences in many non-Western societies where there are attempts to draw on
indigenous concepts and theories. The application of ibn Khaldun's theory to a
civilization and period other than his own is case in point. However, such an effort
does not entail the rejection of scholarship that originated in the West, a point that
is conveyed in the above attempt to apply Khaldunian theory within a modes of
production framework.
This paper indicates an avenue for the integration of a modes of production
framework into ibn Khaldun's theory of state formation, the field of application
being Iranian history. While the economic system of Safavi Iran had been couched
in terms of Marxist concepts, their dynamics had been described in terms of ibn
Khaldun's theory of state formation. As mentioned at the outset, the Safavi political
economy can be characterised in terms of the tributary mode of production as the
dominant mode in a secondary state-based world-system. Ibn Khaldun's work
provides a theoretical framework with which to understand the rise and dynamics
of the Safavi world empire.
At this point it would be useful to point out the sense in which this integration
is a theoretical one. The integration of some Khaldunian and Marxist ideas is not
merely at the substantive level where certain historical facts arising out of the
application of ibn Khaldun's theory are combined with other historical facts arising
out of the application of the concept of mode of production, with a resulting picture
of the past. Although this level of integration is itself important because it highlights
the explanatory value of ibn Khaldun's theory and his continuing relevance to
historical sociology, there is also a theoretical level at which this integration can be
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appreciated.
The object of the field of theoretical history is the "bridging of the gap that
divides the cautiously objective technique employed to ascertain the isolated facts
of history, and the arbitrarily subjective method by which these facts are assembled
into a picture of the past." As such, the territory of theoretical history has a number
of provinces, two of which concern 1) the study of the pattern and rhythm of history,
and 2) the study of driving forces in history. It is these two concerns of theoretical
history that have been brought together in the integration that I have attempted. Ibn
Khaldun's work was a study of the pattern and rhythm of history while the Marxist
framework emphasises the modes of production in the study of the driving forces
of history. Ibn Khaldun's theory which established a pattern and rhythm in history
was applied to Safavi history, while the Safavi political economy was conceptualized
in terms of the mode of production.
In what follows, I would like to make a number of remarks on Khaldunian
studies by way of emphasizing the theme of indigenization.
The study of ibn Khaldun's theory of state formation can be divided into three
aspects. One is the discovery of ibn Khaldun as the founder of a number of
disciplines in the social sciences. Secondly, there are works that seek to draw
comparisons between ibn Khaldun and several Western thinkers. Thirdly, there are
those who attempt to develop and apply ibn Khaldun's theory to specific problems
in the historical and social sciences.
Regarding the discovery of ibn Khaldun, ever since European and American
scholars proclaimed ibn Khaldun as the true founder of sociology before Comte as
well as the precursor of ideas in many other fields such as economics, political
science and anthropology, there have been many descriptive treatments of his
works in the light of his contribution to these various disciplines.
Apart from this, there have also been many works seeking to draw comparisons
between ibn Khaldun and the giants in modern Western thought. Some have ignored
or glossed over profound differences in the historical and philosophical contexts in
which they wrote. The tendency has been to remain at the level of making comparisons
to show that ibn Khaldun had anticipated the ideas of modern thinkers in the
humanities and social sciences.
There have also been works, however, which go beyond the mere comparison
of some ideas and concepts in ibn Khaldun with those of modern Western scholars
toward the theoretical integration of his theory into a framework that employs some
of the tools of modern science, although the field of application has been confined
to West Asian societies. It is this kind of work on Ibn Khaldun that must be
supported and developed if there is to be more than an historical interest in his works.
If by indigenization is meant that there must be conscious attempts to engage
in social scientific activity with a view to taking into account the worldviews,
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sociohistorical contexts, cultural practices, and scholarship of the indigenous societies
so that indigenous concepts and theories can be generated, then ibn Khaldun is a
logical candidate for an exemplar.
The call to indigenization is not simultaneously a call to nativism or reverse
orientalism. This refers to the trend of 'going native' among both Western and local
scholars and constitutes an almost total and wholesale rejection of Western social
science. Indigenization is to be seen as a simultaneous call to internationalization
as long as the latter is understood not as a one-sided process but rather as one
emanating from developing societies while incorporating selectively the Western
social sciences.
National University of Singapore
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